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IS IT POSSIBLE TO KNOW THAT JESUS 
WAS RAISED FROM THE DEAD? 
Stephen T. Davis 
Philosophical discussions of religious knowledge are often general in nature, 
i.e. they take place quite apart from consideration of actual items religious people 
claim to know or rationally believe. In this paper I propose to approach the broad 
epistemological topic of religious knowledge by taking a specific tenet of a specif-
ic religion and asking whether it can be known or rationally believed. The moral I 
hope to draw is that the vastly different conclusions religious believers and non-
believers reach about religious knowledge is due to differences in the world views 
they accept. 
The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is by universal consent a crucial doctrine 
of the Christian faith. Thus it is natural for Christian philosophers who believe the 
doctrine to ask what they can or ought to do as philosophers to defend it. Naturally, 
their first impulse is to engage in some kind of rational apologetic. Though 
apologetics is an enterprise that is often maligned, I believe this is an understand-
able and quite acceptable impulse. I will argue in this paper against a certain way of 
doing apologetics, but I believe all Christians engage in the enterprise. 
Let me distinguish between two sorts of apologetic arguments in favor of the re-
surrection of Jesus. Let us call a "soft apologetic argument" one which attempts to 
demonstrate the rationality of belief in the resurrection of Jesus. And let us call a 
"hard apologetic argument" one which attempts to demonstrate the irrationality of 
unbelief in the resurrection of Jesus. One of my aims in this paper is to show the 
limits of what philosophy can achieve on this issue. I am opposing what I consider 
to be overblown claims that are made on both sides of the issue, i. e. by those who 
hold that rational argument can either verify or falsify the resurrection. I do not be-
lieve it can do either, as I will try to show. As a believer in the resurrection, I natur-
ally hold (and will argue) that Christians are within their intellectual rights in be-
lieving that Jesus was raised from the dead. I But I do not believe it can be shown 
that religious skeptics are not within their intellectual rights in rejecting the doc-
trine. 
There is a paradox that faces any philosopher who writes about the possibility of 
the resurrection of Jesus. On the one hand, some believers in the resurrection hold 
that the evidence in its favor is overwhelming. (I once knew a seminary professor 
who was known to say: "Any rational person who honestly looks at the evidence 
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for the resurrection of Jesus must be convinced by it and become a Christian.") On 
the other hand, many non-believers in the resurrection hold that the claim that 
Jesus was raised from the dead is perfectly absurd. (As an undergraduate 1 studied 
under a man who liked to debunk the biblical miracles; one day in class he dismis-
sed the resurrection with the statement: "1 hope everybody here knows that dead 
people stay dead.") 
What is the reason for this puzzling phenomenon? Why is it that people on both 
sides are so convinced they are obviously correct and the others obviously wrong? 
Of course, we do notice that both sides can offer explanations of the strange be-
havior of the other-believers can claim that non-believers are blinded by sin; non-
believers can claim that believers are blinded by credulity and wishful thinking. 
But is there anything Christian philosophers can helpfully say at this point? 
Perhaps not, but 1 will try. Let me begin with some remarks on the concept of mira-
cle. 
The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is typically classified as a miracle. The 
fountain-head of virtually all contemporary discussion of miracles among 
philosophers is Hume' s argument against miracles in Section X of the Enquiry. 2 I 
believe it is now generally recognized that Hume overstates his case. We cannot a 
priori rule out the possibility of miracles or of rational belief in miracles. 3 But, as 
always, Hume is not the sort of philosopher one can dismiss with a casual wave of 
the hand. Much of his argument, I believe, is beyond reproach. He is mistaken that 
our past experience of the normal course of events by itself settles the question 
whether a miracle can ever occur; but he is surely correct that rational expectation 
of what will happen is based on our best available knowledge of what has hap-
pened. He is mistaken that it can never constitute what he calls the "greater mira-
cle" that the testifiers to a miracle are wrong; but he is surely correct that rational 
people accept the epistemological principle of always rejecting the greater mira-
cle. He is mistaken that it can never be rational to believe that a miracle has occur-
red; but he is surely correct that rational people will require very strong evidence 
indeed before they will believe that a miracle has occurred. 
Suppose a person, Jones, claims that some extraordinary event E occurred, viz. 
that last night between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Bauer Hall levitated six feet above the 
ground. Naturally we would be extremely suspicious of such a claim-for the very 
Humean reason that E is contrary to all our previous experience of the behavior of 
large objects like buildings and thus contrary to our expectations about how Bauer 
Hall will have behaved last night. And our bias in this case seems eminently 
reasonable. We would be quite right to be extremely suspicious of any evidence 
Jones produced or testimony Jones or others gave, even if we could not explain 
their evidence or the reason for their strange belief. 
It is true that the twentieth century revolution in physics has made most scientists 
far more open to the possibility of highly unusual events occurring than religious 
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skeptics or even some rationalistic theologians would make us believe. The physi-
cists I know, at any rate, are seldom prepared to rule out miraculous events-what 
Hume would have called transgressions of naturallaws--on a priori grounds. But, 
as noted above, it still seems a sound epistemological principle that rational expec-
tation about what is likely to occur must be based on what we know has occurred. 
And since we know of no past cases in which buildings have levitated, while we 
cannot rule out on a priori grounds the possibility that E occurred, we have very 
strong reason to doubt that E occurred. 
Accordingly, Hume is correct that we have and rightly should have a strong bias 
against accepting claims that extraordinary events have occurred. We can imagine 
cases-and E is certainly one such-where it would be exceedingly difficult for 
this bias to be overcome. I confess I could not easily be convinced that Bauer Hall 
levitated last night. But surely a point would come, if massive evidence in favor of 
E continued to pile up, where the rational thing would be to lay aside or amend our 
bias against events like E and accept the claim that E has occurred. At what point 
would such a change of mind rationally come about? Surely we can give no general 
rule. All we can say is that it would depend on the strength of our bias against 
events like E, the weight of evidence in favor of E, and the possibility and plausi-
bility of alternative explanations. Critics of Hume are certainly correct in pointing 
out that there have been countless cases where such biases and the expectations 
they create have been rationally overcome. Rational people would once have scof-
fed at the idea of airplanes, vaccines, and trips to the moon. 
However, Humean arguments are still being presented by philosophers. For 
example, Antony Flew offers three arguments, much in the spirit of Hume, against 
those who believe in miracles. 4 (1) People who offer historical or probabilistic ar-
guments in favor of the occurrence of a given purported miracle, Flew says, them-
selves presuppose the very regularity of nature and reliability of nature's laws that 
they argue against. Their position is accordingly inconsistent. 
(2) Once violations of natural law are in principle allowed, what control have we 
over the explanations of events that are offered? For instance (these are my exam-
ples, not Flew's), why not say that in some physically inexplicable way Jesus' 
body simply disappeared after the tomb was closed? Or why not say that the Jewish 
leaders removed the body from the tomb but later were quite unable to produce it 
and thus falsify the disciples' claims because for some psychologically inexplica-
ble reason they forgot they had remov~d it? 
(3) Even if a violation of a natural law be granted, Flew says, how could we ever 
be sure it was God who is responsible for it? Since God is said to be an incorporeal 
being who cannot be seen or touched, the problem seems insurmountable. Notice 
also, Flew adds, that when theists talk about certain theological problems, notably 
the problem of evil, they stress our inability to comprehend God or fathom his 
ways. How then could we ever have rational expectations about what God will do 
150 Stephen T. Davis 
jlj given circumstances? 
Much of what Flew says here is correct. First, theists do indeed presuppose reg-
ular workings of nature in order to argue that certain irregularities, i.e. miracles, 
occur. But this hardly shows that their position is inconsistent. Why cannot nature, 
so to speak, almost but not quite always act regularly and (if we knew enough) pre-
dictably? If it does, then those who wish to argue for certain irregularities will 
naturally do so on the basis of regularities seen elsewhere. If there do tum out to be 
unique events, not analogous to any others (and some scientists argue that there are 
such events, e.g. the "big bang"), we will have no choice but to try to argue for 
them on the basis of regular and repeatable events. 
Second, the only control we either have or need have over proposed explana-
tions of events, once miracles are allowed, is the same control we have, quite apart 
from miracles, over proposed explanations in science and history in general. We 
simply accept the most plausible explanations we can find and reject the others. In 
my view at least, it is far more plausible to hold that God raised Jesus from the dead 
than to say, for example, that his body inexplicably disappeared or that the Jewish 
leaders forgot they had removed it. 
Third, Flew is correct that it seems impossible ever to prove for sure that a given 
event was caused by God. But if a certain event that occurs is scientifically in-
explicable and fits well with a given view of God and his aims, it surely is rational 
for people who hold that view of God and his aims to believe that the event was 
brought about by God. If there is good reason ahead oftime to believe that a mira-
cle-working God exists who is likely in certain circumstances (say after prayers or 
as aspects of epiphanies or incarnations) to cause events like this one, it seems 
reasonable to hold (though we cannot prove) that this event was caused by God.' 
It looks, then, as if Hume's argument against miracles, even as expanded by 
Flew, fails. So in theory at least perhaps our strong commitment to such generali-
zations as "dead people stay dead" could be overcome. Just as we came rationally 
to believe in airplanes, vaccines, and trips to the moon, and just as we could come 
rationally to believe that Bauer Hall levitated, so in theory at least we could come 
rationally to believe in the miracle of Jesus' resurrection from the dead. But in 
practice could such ever be the case? One difficulty that needs to be cleared up con-
cerns the term "miracle." For quite understandable reasons, the word is usually de-
fined in terms of transgressions or violations of natural laws. Critics have been 
quick to point out a complication, however. Since laws of nature are human inven-
tions, i. e. descriptions of observed regularities, if we really became aware of a vio-
lation of (what we understood to be) a law of nature, they say, we should not proc-
laim a miracle but rather simply amend our understanding of the law of nature in 
question--even reject it altogether, if necessary. The issue here is complex, and I 
do not wish to explore it in detail. But fortunately it need not be explored, even in 
a paper on the resurrection of Jesus, an event often considered the paradigmatic 
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miracle. 
For Christians won't mind one bit if it turns out, through some sound process of 
reasoning, that no miracles occur, i.e. that no true natural laws are ever violated 
but rather that some weak ones are just occasionally discovered to be inadequate. 
As long as it is still true, for example, that Jesus was born of a virgin, was raised 
from the dead, healed people, turned water into wine, etc., it wiIl be a matter of 
profound indifference to them whether natural laws are ever violated. 
However, since the issue is unclear, I will continue in this paper to speak ofthe 
resurrection as a miracle. For it must be admitted that with the resurrection we are 
talking not just about a highly unusual event but an event which, given our best 
knowledge of the workings of the world, seems causally impossible. Almost any 
event that occurs can be described in such a way as to have been or at least ration-
ally seemed to have been highly improbable before it occurred. One hundred years 
ago or even five years ago what would have been the odds that in 1981 a Claremont 
philosopher who coaches soccer and whose father was a Nebraska cattle rancher 
would write a paper entitled "Is It Possible to Know That Jesus Was Raised From 
the Dead?" that you would read? The odds would have been low indeed, but the 
point is that there is nothing in this description (as there is in a description of the re-
surrection) that seems causally impossible given our best knowledge. The resur-
rection is not just a unique and improbable event but an intellectual scandal. Ac-
cordingly, an event should probably only be considered a miracle if no purported 
explanation of it that crucially omits God is a good explanation. It just might be 
possible to offer a good explanation of my writing and your reading this paper that 
fails to mention God. And so our doing so, however improbable it may be, is not a 
miracle. But the resurrection of Jesus, if it occurred, in all probability could not be 
explained without God, and so (if it occurred) is probably a miracle. 
It is sometimes said that every miracle is ambiguous in that it can be interpreted 
either as an act of God or as a surprising and perhaps inexplicable natural event. 
But surely this can be said not just about miracles but about almost any event, as 
John Hick has often argued. 6 Name virtually any event, and the religious believer 
and the religious skeptic can disagree on how to interpret it. The one may well see 
it as an act of God and the other will not. They do not differ, so to speak, on the 
facts (both experience the event and acknowledge that it has occurred) but on how 
to interpret or account for the facts. 
However, there is a difference between miracles and natural events in this re-
gard. With natural events (e.g. someone's recovering from a serious illness) the 
believer and the skeptic do not differ on the question whether the event occurred; 
both will agree it did. Their difference concerns the cause and meaning of the 
event. With miracles, however (or at least with certain ofthem, e.g. the resurrec-
tion of Jesus), the believer and the skeptic will typically differ on the fundamental 
question of what precisely occurred. They differ here on the facts. 
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Accordingly, influenced by our earlier distinction between hard and soft 
apologetics, let us make a distinction between hard and soft miracles. A soft mira-
cle, let us say, is a miracle which religious skeptics can consistently agree has oc-
curred; it is just that they will disagree with religious believers on its cause and 
meaning. If Jones, apparently doomed with cancer, is after prayer and fasting 
found to be well and free of cancer, this may well constitute a soft miracle. Skep-
tics can consistently agree that Jones was gravely ill but now is well-they will 
simply deny that Jones' recovery was due to God. A hard miracle, on the other 
hand, is one which is very difficult for religious skeptics to explain naturalistically7 
and so skeptics will not want to allow that it has occurred. The resurrection of Jesus 
appears to be a hard miracle-skeptics apparently cannot agree that it has occurred 
(not as the event is recorded in the Gospels, at any rate) without abandoning religi-
ous skepticism. The strategy of consistent skeptics must accordingly be to argue 
that the event has not in fact occurred. 
Hard miracles are obviously going to be appealing to rational apologists for re-
ligious faith. It is tempting to think ofthem as good devices for evangelism, i.e. for 
converting people from religious skepticism to religious faith. But have any hard 
miracles occurred? Religious believers hold that the answer is yes, and religious 
skeptics will say no. As a Christian, I hold that certain hard miracles have occur-
red, and I believe that the resurrection of Jesus is one of them. But have any events 
occurred that can be shown to be hard miracles? Here I am doubtful. It certainly 
seems possible to me that an event occur which it would be irrational for anyone to 
deny is a hard miracle, but to my knowledge no such events have occurred-not 
even the resurrection. Soft miracles, then, are religiously ambiguous because they 
can be interpreted as natural events; hard miracles are religiously ambiguous be-
cause the ones that have purportedly occurred can apparently be rationally denied. 
How the resurrection can rationally be denied I will consider presently. 
In order to make the problem we face more concrete, let us look at the way be-
lievers and non-believers in the resurrection of Jesus can most persuasively present 
their case. 
Believers in the resurrection fIrst stress the unity of the New Testament witness 
to the resurrection. Despite differences in some details-believers will argue-the 
biblical writers, who give us our earliest testimony to the events after the cricifIx-
ion, unanimously agree that Jesus rose from the dead. 
Second, believers in the resurrection will point out that there are certain facts 
surrounding the resurrection that have virtually been demonstrated by historical 
scholarship and that no competent biblical, theological, or historical scholar de-
nies them. They are, preeminently, that Jesus died on a cross, that certain people 
later came to believe that God had raised him from the dead, and that the firm belief 
in the resurrection that these people had was the heart of the message they proc-
laimed and the reason they so radically changed. Disheartened, confused, and 
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fearful immediately after the crucifixion, they quickly became determined, bold, 
and courageous. The most plausible explanation of these facts-so believers in the 
resurrection will argue-is that Jesus did indeed rise from the dead and show him-
self to the disciples. It does not seem sensible to claim that the Christian Church, a 
spiritual movement whose vitality changed the world, was started by charlatans or 
dupes. If the disciples knew that Jesus was not really risen they were charlatans. If 
they believed he was risen when in fact he was not they were dupes. 
Third, something of an embarassment in the position of non-believers in the re-
surrection can be pointed out-their inability to offer an acceptable alternative 
explanation of the known facts surrounding the resurrection of Jesus. The old 19th 
century rationalistic explanations (swoon theory, stolen body, wrong tomb, etc.) 
all seem to collapse of their own weight once spelled out, and no strong new theory 
has emerged as the consensus of scholars who deny that the resurrection occurred. 
One recent full-blooded attempt to offer such an explanation is Hugh Schonfield's 
The Passover Plot,S a bold and entertaining book. But with its highly fanciful 
hypotheses and selective use of evidence it has drawn much criticism and precious 
little support from scholars. 
The plain fact is that most contemporary Christian theologians who do not be-
lieve that Jesus was dead for three days and then actually lived again offer no exp-
lanation. Many suggest only vague poetic metaphors like "spiritual resurrection," 
the "Easter vision of the disciples," or "dramatic imagery seen through the eyes of 
faith." Some hint that parapsychological phenomena were at work. But does all 
this vague talk mean anything?, the believer in the resurrection will bluntly ask. 
Isn't it just theological jargon amounting to this: "I can't bring myself to believe 
that a real resurrection happened, but something (I don't know what) must have 
happened to account for the disciples' faith"? And surely all this is odd, the be-
liever continues: if the resurrection did not occur it is at least prima facie puzzling 
that no consensus alternative explanation of the known facts has emerged. All in 
all, the believer will say, the most rational position is to believe that Jesus really 
did, as claimed, rise from the dead. 
But non-believers in the resurrection can make an impressive case too. They will 
first argue that the biblical testimony is unreliable. It was written years after the 
event by unsophisticated, myth-prone people who were more interested in for-
mulating statements of faith and in furthering Christian ends than writing accurate 
history. Furthermore, the evidence they present is contradictory: How many 
women visited the tomb? Had the sun risen or was it still dark? Was there one angel 
(or young man) or two? Were they inside the tomb or outside? Did the women keep 
silent or run to tell the disciples? Were the disciples told to stay in Jerusalem or to 
go to Galilee? Was the resurrected Jesus in physical or spiritual form? Did the as-
cension occur immediately after the resurrection, or forty days later? 
But the non-believer's strongest argument will run as follows: "Granted I have 
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no plausible alternative explanation of the known facts; and granted that on the 
basis of the known facts and available possible explanations of them the chances 
are (let's be as generous as possible) 99 out of 100 that the resurrection really hap-
pened; still we must ask the following fatal question: What are the chances that a 
man dead for three days would live again?" In short, the non-believer will claim 
that even if the believer's arguments are strong and even if non-believers can't say 
for sure what did happen, by far the most sensible position is to deny that the resur-
rection occurred. For the probability we should assign to the statement "People 
dead for three days stay dead" is very, very high. Thus the position of the non-be-
liever amounts to this: "I don't know exactly what happened after the crucifixion-
it was, after all, nearly 2000 years ago and by now it's very hard to tell-but what-
ever happened, it certainly wasn't a resurrection." 
But a truly vital factor in the debate would be omitted if we stopped here. For we 
must consider the very different metaphysical world views typically held by be-
lievers and non-believers in the resurrection. The non-believer's position is prob-
ably convincing to the non-believer not primarily because of evidence or argu-
ments in its favor but because it is entailed by the world view he or she accepts. 
Let's call that world view naturalism. It is the view, we will say, which holds that 
the following four statements are true: (1) Nature alone exists. The word "nature" 
is difficult to define precisely, but let us say that it is the sum total of what could in 
principle be observed by human beings or be studied by methods analogous to 
those used in the natural sciences. Accordingly, naturalism excludes God, or at 
least the theistic God. (2) Nature is eternal. Nature is an uncreated thing; there is no 
moment in time when it does not exist; it is not contingent. (3) Nature is uniform. 
There are no non-natural events (e.g. miracles); rather, nature is regular, continu-
ous. (4) Every event is explicible. In principle at least, any event can be explained 
in terms of nature or natural processes, i.e. by explanatory methods similar to 
those used in the natural sciences. 
Similarly, the believer's position is probably convincing to the believer not 
primarily because of evidence or arguments in its favor but because it dovetails 
with the world view he or she accepts. Let's call that world view supernaturalism. 
It is the view, we will say, which holds (1) that something beside nature exists, viz. 
God; (2) that nature depends for its existence on God; (3) that the regularity of na-
ture can be and occasionally is interrupted by miraculous acts of God; and (4) that 
such events are humanly quite unpredictable and inexplicable.9 
All people interpret their experience within a certain philosophical framework. 
For many people, their philosophical assumptions exclude God's existence and the 
possibility of miracles. Such people presumably reject the resurrection not because 
the evidence for it is weak. Surely if the resurrection were not essentially miracul-
ous (if it were like, say, the crucifixion) few rational persons would doubt it. They 
reject the resurrection because it does not fit with their naturalistic world view. The 
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essentially miraculous nature of the resurrection impels them to discount the evi-
dence for it despite their inability to explain what did happen or how the disciples 
came to believe in the resurrection. 
Well then-you will want to ask at this point--did the resurrection of Jesus 
occur? Which is more likely-that the resurrection occurred, or not? To put it in 
Hume's tenns, which is the lesser miracle? My own view will come as no surprise. 
As a supernaturalist and as a Christian it seems to me that the evidence in favor of 
the resurrection is strong. Perhaps it can even be said to be compelling for those 
Christians who admit the possibility of miracles. 10 But the problem is that for those 
who don't, the available evidence i~ not likely to be compelling. 
For as we have seen, the odd thing is that a decision a person makes whether to 
believe in the resurrection is usually made on some basis other than the evidence 
pro and con. (Is this why miracles seem to bring so few people to faith, why Jesus 
was reluctant to perfonn spectacular public miracles?) Those who believe in Christ 
believe in the resurrection; those who accept naturalism do not. 
There is a curious circularity here. As I noted earlier, I believe philosophers 
have shown over against Hume that miracles can occur; the real question is 
whether any have occurred. But when we tum to historical evidence for a pur-
ported miracle, e.g. the resurrection, it turns out that a decision whether or not it 
occurred nonnally turns on whether or not one believes that miracles can occur. 
Perhaps this circularity explains the puzzle with which we began, viz. why Chris-
tians find the evidence for the resurrection so utterly compelling while non-believ-
ers think it sheer foolishness to believe in the resurrection. From the perspective of 
naturalism, the resurrection does seem like a prescientific myth. From the perspec-
tive of supernaturalism, or at least Christian supernaturalism, the resurrection 
seems the best explanation of the evidence. 
The upshot of what I have been arguing is that both belief and disbelief in the re-
surrection of Jesus can be rational. It is a mistake to argue either (1) that it is never 
rational to believe in the resurrection of Jesus, or (2) that belief in the resurrection 
of Jesus is the only rational position. Both arguments have been presented; let me 
comment briefly on each. 
(1) Some Christian theologians in recent years have argued against belief in a 
real resurrection of Jesus from what clearly amounts to a perspective very near 
naturalism. Rather than rejecting talk of the resurrection entirely, as a religious 
skeptic might do, they typically offer what might be called reductive theories of 
the resurrection. "What 'Jesus rose from the dead' really means," they say, "is 
____________ ," where the blank is filled in with a way of under-
standing the resurrection that does not actually involve a dead man coming back to 
life. Thus Rudolf Bultmann: 
Indeed,faith in the resurrection is really the same asfaith in the saving ef-
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ficacy of the cross, faith in the cross. as the cross of Christ. II 
And Willi Marxsen: 
Talk of the resurrection of Jesus is an interpretation designed to express 
the fact that my faith has a source and that source is Jesus ... Jesus is risen 
in that his offer meets us today and in that, if we accept it, he gives us this 
new life. 12 
Bultmann does not try to hide the fact that his understanding of the resurrection 
of Jesus rests on a basically naturalist position (I say basically naturalist because he 
does believe in God). Modem people can no longer believe in mythological 
stories, he says. The idea of dead people rising is utterly inconceivable and incred-
ible to us. In a famous passage, Bultmann says: 
It is impossible to use the electric light and the wireless and to avail our-
selves of modem medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time 
to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles. We may 
think we can manage it in Our own lives, but to expect others to do so is to 
make the Christian faith unintelligible and unacceptable to the modem 
world. 13 
Although much could be said in response to this point of view, let me limit my-
self to two comments. First, the rather condescending air theologians such as 
Bultmann and Marxsen typically take toward pre-modem people, e.g. people in 
New Testament times, seems to me altogether unwarranted. "Such people could 
believe in myths, spirits, and miracles," it is said, "but we modems cannot." The 
implication is that the poor devils just didn't have the benefit of our modem scien-
tific knowledge and reasoning power-that is why they believed such silly things. 
But surely this is grossly exaggerated. If miracles and resurrections were supposed 
to be so commonplace in ignorant times like the first century, why was the resur-
rection of Jesus taken to be so significant? I would have thought that the idea of a 
man dead for three days living again was no less intellectually scandalous to first 
century people than it is to us. (Notice the reaction of the apostle Thomas in John 
20 and of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers in Acts 17 to talk of the resurrec-
tion.) On the whole, 1 would have thought that first century people were no more 
superstitious, credulous, or just plain stupid than we are. 
Second, naturalism is not the only rational position a person can take. 
Bultmann's statement about the wireless is admirably picturesque and pointed, but 
I see no reason to believe it. Precisely why (or in what sense) is it impossible for a 
person who uses the wireless and the electric light to believe that miracles occur? I 
am unable to find any plausible construal of Bultmann's remarks, especially when 
there are today so many apparently quite rational people who both use the wireless 
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and believe in miracles. 
Interpreting Bultmann's remark, Van Harvey says: 
He meant that the act of turning a switch, speaking over a microphone, 
visiting a doctor or a psychiatrist is a practical commitment to a host of be-
liefs foreign to those of the New Testament. It is to say that the world of 
modern theory-be it electrical, atomic, biological, even psychologi-
cal-is a part of the furniture of our minds and that we assume this in our 
reading of the newspapers, in our debates over foreign policy, in our law 
courts, and, it needs to be added, in our writing of history . In other words, 
our daily intercourse reveals that we, in fact, do not believe in a three-
story universe or in the possession of the mind by either angelic or de-
monic beings. 14 
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I do not wish to comment here on demon-possession or on the famed three-story 
universe Bultmann and others think the New Testament writers believed in. The 
real question is: Do our modern beliefs and practices somehow commit us to 
naturalism or near naturalism? Again, I am unable to see why. It is quite correct 
that we are committed to giving naturalistic explanations (i.e. explanations that do 
not involve appeals to miracles) of the vast majority of the events we see occurring. 
But so were first century people. I fail to see any good reason, either from 
Bultmann or Harvey, why a contemporary person cannot consistently be a super-
naturalist. 
(2) Other Christian thinkers, especially theologically conservative ones, try to 
show that belief in the resurrection of Jesus is the only rational position. IS But one 
lesson Christian philosophers and apologists can draw from this paper is that if 
God's existence and the possibility of miracles are not first allowed, i.e. if 
naturalism is not first abandoned, it is difficult for evidence for, or arguments for, 
the resurrection to produce a conversion. The seminary professor who thought that 
any rational person who fairly examines the evidence must convert was wrong. A 
naturalist can say- and unless we can refute naturalism such a position seems to 
me rational- "Yes, the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is strong; I can't pro-
duce a good alternative explanation of what happened, but a resurrection just 
couldn't have happened." 
Apologists for the resurrection are quick to criticize this position, and if we are 
careful only to look at it from a certain rather acute angle it does look weak. 
"True"-the apologist says-"secular historians will not accept the resurrection 
because they insist on a priori grounds that it could not have happened. But why so 
insist? Why not be open-minded rather than dogmatic about what we might find in 
history or in our experience? Let history speak for itself; don't interpret it only 
from the perspective of pre-conceived assumptions." 
Although I am ultimately in sympathy with this criticism of naturalism, I believe 
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it is often presented in far too facile a manner. It ignores the rationality of our bias 
against extraordinary events. I ask: How would you respond if somebody in all ap-
parent sincerity told you that Bauer Hall levitated for an hour last night? Or: How 
would you respond if someone in all sincerity told you John Lennon came back to 
life three days after his death? 
What follows from this, I believe, is that the aim of Christian philosophers who 
want to defend the resurrection ought not be hard apologetics. Unless naturalism 
can first be refuted, it is pointless to try to produce rational arguments which by 
their logical power will coerce conversions, so to speak. Disbelief in the resurrec-
tion does seem to be a rational position. The aim of Christian philosophers ought to 
be soft apologetics. They ought to try to defend belief in the resurrection against 
the objections of critics; demonstrate the rationality of supernaturalism; and show 
that given supernaturalist assumptions, belief in the resurrection makes good 
sense. 
What, then, about the question that forms this paper's title? Is it possible to 
know that Jesus was raised from the dead? Naturally, the answer will depend on 
what is meant by the word "know." If we accept a Cartesian notion of knowledge, 
whereby I know p if and only if I believe p and p is immune to all conceivable 
doubt, the answer is no. The same negative answer holds even if we accept the 
much weakened but far more plausible notion that I know p if and only if I believe 
p and p is immune to all rational doubt. As I have argued, the resurrection can ra-
tionally be doubted. 
We did note, however, that the crucial difference in how one is likely to evaluate 
the claim that Jesus was raised is made by the world view one accepts. The deepest 
question we can ask in this area accordingly emerges: which world view is more 
plausible, naturalism or supernaturalism? Unfortunately, answering that question 
is far beyond the scope of this paper and, perhaps, of my ability. 
But if we ask the question with which we began in this way: Can it be rationally 
believed that Jesus was raised from the dead?, the answer is yes. 
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